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ABSTRACT
The American University in Cairo, Egypt
Fault Tolerant Ethernet Train Network
Name: Mai Mahmoud Hassan Salem Ibrahim
Supervisors: Prof. Hassanein H. Amer and Dr. Ramez M. Daoud

Ethernet use for control networks is an emerging topic of study. Research discusses
the implementation of train control networks using Ethernet. In this research, an
Ethernet Train Control Network for one wagon with a mixed communication load
environment (real-time and non-real-time traffic) was simulated. Both the control and
entertainment loads were implemented on top of Gigabit (GbE) Ethernet, each with a
dedicated controller/server.
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) implementation of the control network at the
sensor level was tested. Results for the case of introducing on-board passengers’
entertainment (Wi-Fi and video streaming) were presented based on OPNET
simulations. Additionally, the network model was further modified to have a control
load with mixed sampling periods. It was shown that this system could tolerate the
failure of one controller in one wagon.
In a two wagon scenario, fault tolerance (FT) at the controller level was studied, and
simulation results showed that the system could tolerate the failure of 3 controllers.
The hybrid model scenario was successful in meeting the packet end-to-end delay
with zero packet loss in all OPNET simulated scenarios.
A supervisor was further interconnected to both wagons. Two fault tolerance analyses
were presented by studying the reallocation of the control load according to the
number of Servers failed. In the first analysis the supervisor was acting in a passive
manner where it only acts when all the other Controllers/Entertainment Servers fail.
The other analysis presented an active supervisor that acts once a Controller fail.
The main measuring metric used is the maximum real-time control packet end-to-end
delay and ensure it meets its constraints. All simulations are conducted on OPNET
Network Modeler and results are subjected to a 95% confidence analysis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Networks are categorized as either control networks or data communication
networks. Control networks are used to transmit control packets which are small in
size and must meet time-critical requirements. Since control packets are real time, the
transmission of such packets has to be successfully assured within the required time
period [1]. There are several control protocols used in train control networks such as
Local Operating Networks (LonWorks), Train Communication Networks (TCN) and
Controller Area Network (CAN) [2, 3]. The LonWorks protocol is common in
Europe, while the TCN is used in the USA. CAN is also used but not widely as TCN
or LonWorks [2, 3].
Since Ethernet appeared in the world of wired communication systems, the
implementation of Ethernet as a communication medium for Networked Control
System became a must. Ethernet is based on the CSMA/CD mechanism. Even though
Ethernet is non-deterministic by nature, this did not stop researchers in academia and
industry from using the Ether-Channel as a communication medium for Control
Systems. With the introduction of switches, the non-deterministic nature of Ethernet
is partially resolved. Now, different problems exist such as queuing delays and queue
lengths. The non-deterministic nature of Ethernet was first thought to be problematic
because of the real-time constraints inherent in control systems; however, research
shows that Ethernet (or IEEE Std 802.3) performed well in Networked Control
System either by changing packet format for real-time control messages, or by giving
higher priority for these messages [4, 5, 6]. The standardization process for the use of
Ethernet in control is also under way [7, 8]. Rockwell Automation and the ODVA
organization proposed the Ethernet/IP as an industrial version of Ethernet and they
have developed the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) [9, 10]. Furthermore, TT
Ethernet and FTT Ethernet are in the course of standardization [11, 12]
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In railway systems, in order to assure safety and efficiency along the journey the
train network has to ensure that four main aspects are controlled within a train; these
aspects are [13]:
1. Train protection: it is the process of preventing any possible accidents, route
interlocking or exceeding of the speed limits, e.g., route interlocking and over
speed protection.
2. Train operation: it is the process of controlling the train motion during the
journey and regulating the journey termination at the stations. Also, it includes
controlling of the doors and air conditioning in the train, e.g., speed regulation
and door control.
3. Train supervision: it is the process of guaranteeing that the train follows the
schedule and the proper path while recording any malfunction, e.g.,
performance modification and malfunction recording
4. Communication: it is the process of enabling the train to communicate with
other system elements and allowing exchange of information, e.g., passenger
service and status of the system.
In addition to theses main aspects, passenger demand to have more information
and entertainment services on-board of trains has been increasing. As Ethernet
networks have a relatively wide bandwidth in comparison to other control protocols
used in trains, it allows providing some entertainment services beside the control
services.
Chapter 2 summaries the literature review. First, CAN, TCN and LonWorks as
control protocols in trains are presented. Additionally, the use of Ethernet (IEEE
802.3) without any modifications in the context of NCS is illustrated. Ethernet is used
as a control protocol in industrial system, automotive on-board networks and in onewagon train networks. This proved to be successful not only for pure control loads but
also when mixing real-time and non-real-time entertainment messages. The
introduction of fault-tolerance into these schemes is also shown.
Since safety and efficiency are critical in railways, further research to enhance the
train network reliability while meeting the control packet end-to-end delay
requirement was essential. In Chapter 3, using the same model presented in the
literature, enhancing one-wagon train network reliability at the sensor level using
triple modular redundancy (TMR) is demonstrated. In addition, a two-wagon model is
3

also simulated to ensure its functionality. The reliability for this model is also
calculated.
Chapter 4 focuses on investigating a more realistic train wagon model with
multiple sampling periods and different. Pyramid architecture at the controller level is
studied. A passive supervisor is added to the network.
In chapter 5, an active supervisor rather than a passive one is integrated into the
network. The network performance is presented and a comparison with the network
with passive supervisor is performed. Furthermore, a reliability study is conducted to
establish the best performing supervision scheme.
This thesis is concluded in Chapter 6.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
II.1. CONTROL PROTOCOLS IN TRAINS
There are various types and products used in trains nowadays. Consequently, there
are different types of networks in trains. There are networks that function in a train
wagon. Other networks control the overall train functionality. There are many
different protocols that are used in operating the trains. Among the various networks
used in trains are: Control Area Network (CAN), Train Communication Network
(TCN) platform, and LonWorks platform.

II.1.1. CONTROL AREA NETWORK (CAN)
The CAN protocol was designed by Robert Bosch for use in automotive controls
networks. The CAN protocol is a deterministic one. Moreover, its performance is
prioritized with short messages and is capable of detecting faults in the network
through extensive error detection mechanism [14]. This protocol has other nonautomotive applications, such as in trains and is applied widely. One reason for the
spread of the CAN is the simplicity of its components [14]. The limitations of the
CAN occur in the access of the medium because the nodes must listen to the bus
while transmitting packets/messages, and the control word length is at least double the
propagation, which prevents this protocol from having high speeds except for short
distances [14]. In trains, TCN and LonWorks are dominating train control networks in
the market more than CAN protocol.

II.1.2. TRAIN COMMUNICATION NETWORK (TCN)
The manufacturing of a train is a very complicated task concerning many
electronic subsystems, from different manufacturers, as well as various standards and
protocols applied. These subsystems need to be integrated by cabling, control and
providing interfaces between these subsystems. Moreover, there is a need to eliminate
some problems such as trains having different vehicles/wagons from different
vendors/manufactures and the frequent separation or addition of new wagons. These
operations can be done daily with high frequency. The interoperability issue can be
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achieved

only

through

setting

international

standards.

The

International

Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), in collaboration with the Union Internationale
des Chemins de Fer (UIC), designed the TCN standard [15].
TCN is composed of two different networks with somewhat different protocols.
The first protocol is Wire Train Bus (WTB). It is used along the length of the entire
train [16]. It interconnects vehicles over hand-plug jumper cables or automatic
couplers. The Multi-function Vehicle Bus (MVB) is the second protocol. It is used for
networks within a single wagon. It connects equipment within a wagon, or within
different wagons in closed train sets. MVB controller provides redundancy at the
physical layer, i.e., a device transmits on the redundant lines, but listens to one while
monitoring the other. Figure 1 shows the structure of a TCN network.
Figure 1: Overview of the TCN Structure [16]

II.1.3. LONWORKS PROTOCOL
The idea behind LonWorks platform is developing a technology which addresses
“the networking of everyday device” [17]. It is a product of Echelon Corporation in
which it is built on a low bandwidth protocol created by Echelon Corporation for
networking devices over different media
LonWorks is widely used in many fields, mainly in the building automation,
transportation, medical, industrial, home, utility, etc. [17]. It is also popular for the
automation of various functions within buildings such as lighting. The reason that
LonWorks is involved in all these markets and others is that the platform was
designed to control various and general devices.
LonWorks is used as a control network in trains network Management. Network
management refers to maintenance and administration of network nodes [18]. Train
network is always changing in terms of the nodes connected to the network; hence the
network management of a train is never fixed. This type of network management is
known to have a “continuous installation” scenario [13]. There are 2 scenarios for
6

network management in LonWorks trains: single network manager or multiple
network managers. In single network manager there is only one network manager
node in the whole train and all the devices in the train are connected to this manager.
The advantage of such system is that there are some message types that will travel
with very high speed [19]. While in multiple network managers system each device in
a train car is connected to a local network manager called Proxy Nodes. All Proxy
nodes are connected to a single train manager that is found in one of the locomotive
cars of the train [19]. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the LonWorks different management.
Figure 2: A single network manager [19]

Figure 3: Multiple network managers [19]
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II.2. ETHERNET IN NCS
Since Ethernet is a communication non-deterministic protocol, the use of Ethernet
without modification as a control protocol is a challenge and has been studied in
multiple researches [1, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. It has even been studied for
adoption in aerospace systems [28]. Below is a summary of the work done regarding
Ethernet integration in Industrial control systems as well as terrestrial transportation
systems (vehicular and railway). These researches show the possibility of using
Ethernet as a control protocol in the automation field despite of its non-deterministic
nature. Therefore, further research is required to simulate the use of Ethernet in a
realistic train model.

II.2.1. ETHERNET IN INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
Automated work cells consist of sensors (sen.), controllers and actuators (act.)
connected over the network [29]. Sensor nodes, known as source nodes because the
data flow originates at these nodes, are smart nodes. Actuator nodes, also called sink
nodes because the data flow ends at these nodes, are also smart. Smart
sensors/actuators (SAs) have network communication capabilities and sometimes they
have self diagnostic and calibration features as well. The smart sensor collects
physical data from the process under control and sends it in a packet format after
encapsulation over the communication network to reach the controller. At the
controller the data is de-capsulated, analyzed and processed; a control word is
generated, encapsulated and sent over the network once again to reach the smart
actuator node. The smart actuator collects the control word from the network and
applies it to the physical process after de-capsulation.
In [29, 30], the authors tested Fast and Gigabit (Gb) Switched Ethernet Networked
Control System for automated work cell implementation. In this model, each machine
is an isolated control LAN. An overhead of non-real-time applications was also added
to the real-time control data flow to create a mixed traffic environment. The IEEE
802.3 or Ethernet protocol was used without modifications as the control network
protocol [31]. OPNET [32] simulations revealed the success of the tested model [30].
A fault-tolerant model at the controller level was also tested in [33, 34] to form a
linear model simulating the in-line process. In these simulations, different controllers
8

connected on the same network in a linear topology could back up each other in case
one controller failed. A fault-tolerant hierarchical model was also introduced and
tested in [35, 36] introducing a supervisor node on top of many controllers connected
in the form of a continuous line.

II.2.2. ETHERNET IN AUTOMOTIVE ON-BOARD NETWORKS
The success of the Ethernet use in industrial Networked Control System was the
motive behind trying its implementation in automotive on-board networks. Electronic
Stability Program (ESP), Anti-lock braking system (ABS), drive by-wire, brake bywire, electronic assisted steering and many other applications are good examples of
today’s electronics applications on-board of a moving vehicle. Other functions
include passive as well as active safety and entertainment on board of the vehicles.
Based on the Ford model in [37], a 90-node model was successfully tested using
OPNET simulations for pure control automotive on-board network [38]. This model
was further modified by the authors to include Triple Model Redundancy (TMR) at
the sensor level [39] and fault-tolerance at the controller level [37].

II.2.3. ETHERNET TRAIN CONTROL NETWORK
Due to the current technological advancement, entertainment and multimedia are
becoming a necessity on board of moving vehicles. Moreover, as previously
presented, researchers proved that Ethernet could be used as a control protocol in
industrial machinery and in cars [37]. Consequently, Ethernet, with its wide
bandwidth, has evolved as a promising technology in train control networks over the
currently used protocols such as Local Operating Networks (LonWorks), Train
Communication Networks (TCN) and Controller Area Network (CAN) [2, 3]. In [40],
it was shown that the use of Ethernet, as a control protocol in trains, could allow
carrying an entertainment load on top of the control load. This was achieved without
jeopardizing the packet end-to-end delay requirement of the control data. A GbE
network model had been proposed as a control and entertainment network within a
one 60-seat train wagon (W) [41]. The network consisted of 250 nodes, the maximum
number of sensors and actuators currently allowable in train standards [42], divided
into 125 sensors and 125 actuators; i.e., a 1:1 sen:act [40]. Examples of such smart
9

sensor nodes are the ones used in ventilation systems (HVAC), door lock monitor,
brake systems, friction monitor systems, etc… Such type of sensor nodes is used for
vehicle health monitoring applications. Additionally, there were two categories of
entertainment traffic added to the control traffic. The first load was in the form of
video streams. The second load was a Wi-Fi traffic produced from mobile wireless
nodes (laptops). These laptops were running web browsing (HTTP), email, File
transfer protocol (FTP) and database (DB) applications [40]. The sensors, actuators
and video screens were all connected via a main switch to a controller that handles
control and entertainment loads. However, the Wi-Fi nodes were connected to the
controller and the main switch via a wireless access point (AP).
With a packet payload of 32 bytes [42], the sensor to actuator control packet endto-end delay was measured using OPNET simulations. This measured delay included
all the processing, propagation, encapsulation and de-capsulation delays. All
simulations were run for 16ms and 1ms sampling periods separately. Figure 4
illustrates the network model used in [40].

Figure 4: One Wagon Train Network [40]
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II.2.4. FAULT TOLERANT TRAIN NETWORK AT THE
CONTROLLER LEVEL
In order to increase system reliability, two controllers were used instead of one
controller [43]. A Control Server (Controller) handled the control load and an
Entertainment Server handled the entertainment traffic (video streams and Wi-Fi
load). Furthermore, to enhance system reliability, the Entertainment Server acted as a
backup for the Controller. The figure below shows the enhanced network model that
was simulated with OPNET.
In case the Controller failed, the Entertainment Server handled both the control
traffic and entertainment load. For the Entertainment Server to handle the control
traffic, sensors sent their packets to both the Controller and Entertainment servers. In
case of the Entertainment Server failure, the system dropped both the video streams
and the Wi-Fi services.
Since the Entertainment Sever acted as backup for the Controller, both the
Entertainment Sever and the Controller received all the control packets from the
sensors. This was achieved while meeting the sensor-actuator packet delay
requirements. Figure 5 shows the enhanced network model.

Figure 5: Enhanced One Wagon Train Network [43]
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III. TRAIN NETWORK RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENT
The network model simulated is a GbE network in a star topology with optical
fiber connections. The model consisted of 2 main networks: the control network and
the entertainment network sharing the same resources. The network model was
enhanced in this research at the sensor level through using triple modular redundancy.
The network model is simulated using OPNET network simulator. In this chapter the
reliability enhancement at the sensor level is illustrated.

III.1. ONE WAGON MODEL WITH TMR AT THE SENSOR
LEVEL
In this enhanced model each train wagon contains a total of 250 nodes [42]. In [40]
the sen:act used was 1:1. However, the control network in the model studied next has
a sen:act of 3:1 for triple modular redundancy (TMR) to have a total of 500 nodes per
wagon. All the sensors and actuators are arranged in subnets. There are 4 subnets;
each had 125 nodes in which there are 1 subnet for actuators (125 actuators) and 3
subnets for sensors (375 sensors). All the control services are handled by the
Controller which was connected to the subnets through a main switch.
The entertainment network consists of 2 main subnets; the video streaming subnet
and the Wi-Fi subnet. The Video Stream subnet is composed of video screens which
are connected to the Entertainment Server through the main switch to receive video
streams. There are 2 video stream qualities in use:
1. The minimum acceptable video quality (MAVQ) with 128×240 pixels resolution
and 16 bits /pixel. The frame rate for this quality is 24 frames /second [45].
2. The uncompressed DVD quality is based on National Television System
Committee (NTSC) standard with a resolution of 240×352 pixels and 24
bits/pixel. The used frame rate is 29.97 frames/ second [46].
Furthermore, the Wi-Fi subnet consists of Wi-Fi laptop nodes connected to the
Entertainment Server through a wireless AP then the main switch. The Wi-Fi nodes
have HTTP, FTP, DB, and email as running applications. Figure 6 shows the network
schematic used during the simulations.
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Figure 6: TMR One Wagon Train Network Model

In this research, there are 2 approaches used to increase the reliability of the network.
First, the Entertainment Server acts as a backup for the Controller as in [43]. In
case of failure of the Controller, the Entertainment Server handles both the control
and the entertainment loads with a degraded performance in the number of video
streams supplied from the Entertainment Server [43]. For the Entertainment Server to
deal with the control data, it has to receive signals from the sensors. Additionally,
there is a watchdog signal between both the Controller and the Entertainment Server
to ensure the proper functionality of the Controller [43]. This watchdog signal are sent
at a rate of 1ms with a packet size of 32 bytes. In case of failure of the Entertainment
Server, all the Entertainment services are dropped.
Second, a Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) model for the sensors is used. In this
model, each sensor is triplicated. Identical data packets are sent from each of the three
sensors to the Controller. The Controller compares all three packets and if they are
within the allowable tolerance range, it forwards one decision packet to the
appropriate actuator. On the other hand, if one of the three packets does not match the
others, the controller concludes that the sensor responsible for sending such a faulty
packet has failed and therefore ignores its packets. The final decision is taken by the
controller based upon the other two packets and the system will not fail even though
one of the sensors did fail [47, 48, 49].
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The first consequence for having this more reliable model is having extra hardware
in which the number of sensors is tripled to be 375 rather than 125. Furthermore, there
is added hardware due to the presence of the Controller and the Entertainment Server
rather than just one controller. Another main consequence is the increase in the
number of packets in comparison to the number of packets in [40] and [43].
Therefore, the number of packets passing through the main switch increases
dramatically.
Switch Forwarding Rate
The main switch used in the model presented in [40, 43] was the generic switch in
OPNET. This generic switch has a packet forward rate of 0.5 Mpps. However, with
the increase in the number of packets due to the triple modular redundancy of the
sensors, this forward rate is not enough to pass both the control packets and video
stream packets. Consequently, this forward rate has to be increased to a value that is
high enough to pass all the packets and meet the maximum allowable delay for the
control packets. In this research it is found that the minimum forward rate that would
ensure meeting all the time constraints in all simulated scenarios is 2.2 Mpps. This
number is rather small compared to the forwarding rate of the 128 port switches
available in the market. For example, the Cisco Catalyst 3560 series GbE switches
have a minimum forward rate of 38.2 Mpps [50]. Therefore the presented results are
pessimistic. If a switch with a forward rate of 38.2 Mpps had been used, the end-toend delay would have been smaller.
In this triple modular redundant model the simulation scenarios are a combination
of having:
•

Two controllers or one controller (simulating the failure of the Controller).

•

Two different sampling rates (1 ms and 16 ms).

•

Two video qualities (DVD and MAVQ).

The exact scenarios used are further explained in the simulation outcomes and
results section later.
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III.1.1. SIMULATED SCENARIOS AND OUTCOMES
The main metric for all the models is the maximum sensor-to-actuator packet endto-end delay. The sensor-to-actuator packet end-to-end delay is the sum of packet
delay at the Controller and at the actuator. This delay takes into account processing,
propagation, encapsulation and de-capsulation delays.
In this triple modular redundant model the simulation scenarios are a combination
of having different number of controllers, different sampling rates and different video
qualities. The scenarios are divided into 4 main scenarios. Scenarios One and Two
simulate the fault free (FF) network model while scenarios three and four simulate the
network when the Controller fails and the Entertainment Server handles both the
control and the entertainment loads.
In simulation outcomes figures below the X-axis represent the simulation time in
minutes and the Y-axis represent the delay in seconds. Also, in the figures below the
red dots indicate the end-to-end delay from the acting Controller/Server to the
actuator node and the blue dots indicate the end-to-end delay from the sensor to the
Controller. The total packet end-to-end delay is the sum of the red and blue dots.

III.1.1.1. SCENARIO ONE
In Scenario One (a), the network consists of:
•

16 ms Sampling period

•

Two Controllers

•

Minimum video quality (MAVQ)

The worst sensor to actuator packet end-to-end delay resulting from this scenario is
9.47 µs while loading the network with entertainment data from 60 Wi-Fi laptops and
60 video streams. Due to the higher forwarding rate of the switch than in [40] and
[43], the queuing delay at the switch decreased; this resulted in a significant decrease
in the end-to-end delay in comparison to [43]. Despite the fact that the worst delay is
0.059% of the maximum allowable delay, which is the same as the sampling period,
no more traffic is added as it is assumed that the wagon contains only 60 seats [41].
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In Scenario One (b), the network consists of:
•

1 ms Sampling period

•

Two Controllers

•

MAVQ

The network would be able to carry up to 60 video streams and 60 Wi-Fi nodes
with an end-to-end delay of 11.4 µs which is 1.14% of the maximum allowable delay.
Figure 7 shows the OPNET delay outcomes for Scenario One (b).
Figure 7: Scenario One (b), Control Packet End-to-End Delay

III.1.1.2. SCENARIO TWO
In Scenario Two (a), the network consists of:
•

16 ms Sampling period

•

Two Controllers

•

DVD Quality

Even though the produced delay for this scenario is 9.9 µs (0.062% of maximum
acceptable delay(MCD)), 60 Wi-Fi nodes and only 15 video streams were added onto
the network which is not the maximum number of seats in a train wagon. This
limitation in the number of video streams is caused by the saturation of the Gb links
used in the network. The figure below shows the OPNET delay outcomes for Scenario
Two (a).
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Figure 8: Scenario Two (a), Control Packet End-to-End Delay

In Scenario Two (b), the network consists of:
•

1 ms Sampling period

•

Two Controllers

•

DVD Quality

The worst end-to-end delay is 12.885 µs, i.e., 1.29% of the MCD requirement. The
network is loaded with 60 Wi-Fi nodes and 15 video streams.

III.1.1.3. SCENARIO THREE
In Scenario Three (a), the network consists of:
•

16 ms Sampling period

•

One Controller

•

MAVQ

This scenario simulates the case when the Controller fails and the Entertainment
Server handles both the control and Entertainment Data. In comparison with the
outcomes of [40], the increase in the switch forwarding rate still plays a major role in
decreasing the packet end-to-end delay. The produced delay is 12.25 ms with 60
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video streams and 60 Wi-Fi nodes. The figure below shows the OPNET delay
outcomes for Scenario Three (a).
Figure 9: Scenario Three (a), Control Packet End-to-End Delay

In Scenario Three (b), the network consists of:
•

1 ms Sampling period

•

One Controller

•

MAVQ

The worst sensor to actuator delay is 0.56 ms. The entertainment traffic is
produced from 12 video streams and Wi-Fi nodes. The limitation for the number of
video streams now is meeting the time constraints for the control data since both types
of data (control and entertainment) are handled by the Entertainment Server.

III.1.1.4. SCENARIO FOUR
In Scenario Four (a), the network consists of:
•

16 ms Sampling period

•

One Controller

•

DVD quality

In this scenario, the number of video streams carried by the network, besides 60
Wi-Fi nodes, is 14 with a control packet end-to-end delay of 14.05 ms.
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In Scenario Four (b), the network consists of:
•

1 ms Sampling period

•

One Controller

•

DVD quality

Here the number of video streams supported by the network shrinks down to 3
streams as the amount of produced control packets is more as compared to the 16 ms
scenario. Therefore, to avoid the congestion of the links, the number of streams had to
be decreased in order not to degrade the performance of the control network. The
delay output of OPNET for this scenario is shown in the figure below.

Figure 10: Scenario Four (b), Control Packet End-to-End Delay
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All the sensor-to-actuator packet end-to-end delays are less than the maximum
allowable delays. Moreover,zero packet loss was achieved. The following table
summarizes resulting end-to-end delays for each scenario simulated with the
entertainment load carried by the network.
Table 1: Summary of TMR Simulation Outcomes

Sampling
Num of
Controllers Period (ms)

Scenarios

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

Num. of
Video Stream

End-to-End
Delay (µs)

a

2

16

60*

9.47

b

2

1

60*

11.4

a

2

16

15**

9.9

b

2

1

15**

12.885

a

1

16

12*

12252.8

b

1

1

60*

561.2

a

1

16

14**

14051.2

b
* MAQV

1

1
3**
** DVD video quality
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715.7

III.2. TWO WAGONS NETWORK MODEL
The reliable one wagon train model presented in the above section is futher
expanded into a two wagon model [44]. Each wagon still consists of 500 SAs with a
3:1 sen:act ratio. This is to implement TMR at the sensors level. Like in the one
wagon model, all the sensors and actuators are connected via the main switch in each
wagon to the Controller. Moreover, 60 video streams and 60 Wi-Fi laptops consistute
the entertainemnt load. The video streams quality used is MAVQ. Additionally, the
Wi-Fi nodes are running the same applications mentioned in the above section. The
entertainment load is handled by the Entertainement server in each wagon [51].
The two wagons are interconnected at the main switch level via a 10GbE optical
fiber cable. For each Controller and each Entertainemnt Server in each wagon to act
as backup for other servers, they need to receive the data from the sensors in both
wagons. Consqeuently, each sensor multicasts its packet to all Controllers and
Entertainement Servers in both wagons. In other words, each sensor forwards four
replicas of its packet to two Controllers and two Servers in the network model.
In this two wagon model, all 4 servers act as backup to each other. This means that
if a Controller within one wagon fail, the Controller of the second wagon will carry
the control load of both wagons. For this fault tolerant model to be achievable, the
four servers share a watchdog signal among them with a packet size of 32 bytes and
sent every 1ms. Consquently, if one controller fails the remaining ones will be able to
identify that. The other controller in the other wagon will act and take over the control
load of the first wagon. Figure 11 shows the two wagon network model.
The main bottle neck to be monitored is the main switchs forwarding rate. In the
one wagon train model presented above a forwading rate of 2.2Mpps is used.
However, since the control load is three times more than in the one wagon train
wagon, therefore, the forwarding rate has to be increased up to 6.6Mpps. This
forwarding rate allows the control packet end-to-end delay to just meet the delay
requirement. This increase in the forward rate will not cause any implementation
obstacles since the forwarding rate of the 128 port switches available in the market is
much larger that 6.6Mpbs. As mentioned before the Cisco Catalyst 3560 series
Gigabit Ethernet switches have a minimum forward rate of 38.2Mpbs [50].
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Figure 11: Two Wagons Network Model

III.2.1. TWO WAGONS SIMULATED SCENARIOS
The main metric under study is still the maximum sensor-to-actuator packet endto-end delay. In this study, two main scenarios are simulated. The first scenario shows
the network outcomes in normal full functioning manner with all four controllers (one
Controller and one Entertainment Server per wagon) for both 16ms and 1ms sampling
periods. In this scenario, the Controller handles the control data while the
Entertainment Server handles the video streaming and the Wi-Fi load within its
wagon while receiving the control packets from all sensors. The packet end-to-end
delay is calculated from a sensor to the actuator within the same wagon.
In the scecond scenario, the worst case scenario is simulated in which all servers
fail except one server. If this server is a Controller, it handles the control load of both
wagons. If this server is an entertainment server, then it drops the entertainment load
and handles all the control load of both wagons.
Processing, propagation, encapsulation and de-capsulation delays are all
considered in the delay measurement.
As in the previously mentioned the X-axis represent the simulation time in minutes
and the Y-axis represent the delay in seconds in the OPNET figures below. Also, the
red dots indicate the end-to-end delay from the acting Controller/Server to the
actuator node and the blue dots indicate the end-to-end delay from the sensor to the
Controller. The total packet end-to-end delay is the sum of both delays.
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III.2.1.1. SCENARIO ONE
In Scenario One (a) the network consists of:
•

16ms Sampling period

•

Two Controllers and two Entertainment Servers

The maximum sensor to actuator packet end-to-end delay measured in each wagon.
The delay produced was less than 1% of the the maximum allowable delay. This
delay is produced while loading the network with data from 60 Wi-Fi laptops and 60
video streams. Since it is assumed that the wagon contains only 60 seats, adding more
traffic would be irrelavent.
In scenario One (b) the network has:
•

1ms Sampling period

•

Two Controllers and two Entertainment Servers

60 video streams and 60 Wi-Fi nodes were attached to the network. The produced
end-to-end delay is still below 10% of the maximum allowable delay. The figure
below shows the delay outcomes for this scenario.
Figure 12: Scenario One (b), Two wagons End-to-End Delay
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III.2.1.2. SCENARIO TWO
In scenario Two (a) the network consists of:
•

16ms Sampling period

•

One controller carrying all control functions in both wagons

All entertainment loads have been dropped in this scenario as it is considered a
critical situation. The sensor to actuator packet end-to-end delay still has a worst value
thar is less than 1% of the maximum allowable delay.
In scenario Two (b) the network includes:
•

1 ms Sampling period

•

One controller carrying all control functions in both wagons

The worst end-to-end delay, with no entertainment load, is less than 2% of the
maximum allowable delay. Figure 13 shows the simulation outcome.
Figure 13: Scenario Two (b), Two wagons End-to-End Delay
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III.3. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE TRAIN NETWORK
MODEL
III.3.1. RELIABILITY MODEL OF THE FAULT-TOLERANT
CONTROLLER
For the control function to fail within one wagon, BOTH the Entertainment Server
and the Controller should fail. However in a two wagons model, the control function
of the whole network will fail after the failure of both Controllers and both
Entertainment Servers [52]. Consequently, the control function is achieved through a
parallel system consisting of two Controllers and two Entertainment Servers [48, 49].
Figure 14 illustrates the system reliability block diagram.
Figure 14: Parallel system reliability block diagram

If RK(t), also referred to as RK, is the reliability of a Controller and RE(t) , also
referred to as RE, is the reliability of an Entertainment Server. Furthermore, let
Rcont_FT(t), also referred to as Rcont_FT, be the reliability of the control function. Then,
_

( )=

_

= 1 − (1 −

) (1 −

)

(1)

The term (1- RK) is the probability of failure of a Controller while (1-RE) is the
probability of failure of an Entertainment Server.
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The fault-tolerant two wagon model is expected to enhance the reliability of the
control function, which is worth studying. If no fault-tolerance is applied, the control
functionality within any wagon would fail by the failure of its Controller. The figure
below shows the system reliability model without fault tolerance.
Figure 15: Series system reliability block diagram

Let Rcont(t), also referred to as Rcont, indicates the control function reliability with
no fault tolerance. Then,
( )=

(2)

=

For an exponentially-distributed failure time, the failure rate is constant. If λK is the
Controller failure rate, then

=

( )=

( )=

=

[48, 49]. For simplicity, assume

the Entertainment Server is assumed to have the failure rate λE = λK= λ. Therefore, it
has a failure rate

=

=

. Applying a numerical

example using λE = λK = λ = 1/month, Figure 16 shows Rcont_FT and Rcont for a period
of 2 month. The improvement in reliability is clear.
Figure 16: Reliability Comparison
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III.3.1.1. EFFECT OF COVERAGE ON SYSTEM RELIABILITY
In the above analysis, the switching of the control tasks from a failed Server to
another operational server is assumed to be always successful. This is somehow an
optimistic view. In real life, there is always the possibility that the switching
mechanism would fail. For example, if the inter-communication between the
operational Servers fails, a Server in one wagon may assume that the other Server in
the other wagon has failed and hence, will take over its tasks. Such a conflict will
cause a system failure [53, 54]. As the reconfiguration process successfulness is not
guaranteed, it has to be considered in the reliability model. The probability of
successful detection/reconfiguration is called coverage [48, 49, 55, 56]. The coverage
is defined as the proportion of faults from which a system can automatically recover
[53]. The coverage is included in reliability/availability models and it’s determined by
the user. Any small mistake in the calculation of the coverage leads to false
reliability/availability estimations [49]. Moreover, if the coverage of a system
decreases, the system reliability is expected to decrease as well.
Figure 17 shows the Markov model that will be used to calculate the reliability
of the control function (Rcont_FT) discussed above. In this model, it is assumed, for
simplicity, that λK = λE = λ. Consequently, the failure of any the four
controllers/servers may cause a system failure with a probability (1-c), where c is the
coverage. In other words, if c=1, the system is really a parallel system with four
components; it fails after the failure of the fourth component.
Figure 17: Conservative Markov Model
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Any state in Figure 17 indicates the number of operational server in that state. This
is why the initial state is called “4” and the final (absorbing) state is called “0”.
Moving from state “i” to state “i-1” (for i=1 to 4) occurs when one of the operational
components fails and the recovery is successful (with a probability c). Remember that
c is the coverage parameter. For example, moving from state 4 to state 3 occurs at a
rate of (4×λ×c) because there are four components that can fail and the system will
only move to state 3 if the recovery is successful. If the recovery is not successful, the
system moves from state 4 directly to state 0 (the failure state) at a rate 4λ(1-c).

Finally,
_

=

_

(t) = 1 −

!"

(3)

0$

The Markov model can be described by the following Chapman-Kolmogorov
equations (in matrix form) [48]:
&( ) =

' ( )
= ( )×)
'

(4)

Where
& ( ) = +' 4(t) ' 3(t) ' 2(t) ' 1(t) ' 0(t),
'
'
'
'
'
' 4 ' 3 ' 2 ' 1 ' 0
=+
,
'
'
'
'
'
( ) = - 4(t)
1
0
and ) = 0
0
/

−42
0
0
0
0

3(t)
432
−32
0
0
0

2(t)
0
332
−22
0
0

1(t)
0
0
232
−2
0

0(t). = - 4

42(1 − 3)
6
32(1 − 3)
5
22(1 − 3)5
5
2
4
0
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3

2

1

0.

Given that P4(0)=1 and P3(0) = P2(0) = P1(0) = P0(0) = 0, the ChapmanKolmogorov equations can be solved in closed form as follows to find the probability
of being in a certain state:
4( ) = 4 =

3( ) = 3 = 43 9
2( ) =

(5)

7

2 = 63 (

1( ) = 1 = 4c : 9

:

−
−2
−3

7

(6)

;
:

+
+3

7

)
;

(8)

0( ) = 0 = 1 − 9 4( ) + 3( ) + 2( ) + 1( );

(9)

:

−

(7)
7

If λ = 1/month (as above), the effect of coverage can be seen in Figure 18.
Rcont_FT is shown for several values of the coverage parameter c. The effect of an
incorrect estimation of the coverage is clear. For example, using c=0.95 instead of 0.9
will yield a reliability of 38.27% instead of 32.97% after two months.
Figure 18: Effect of Coverage in Conservative Model
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It is interesting to note here, that for c=1, the system is really a parallel system (as
mentioned above). Solving the Markov model of Figure 17 with c=1 will produce the
same Rcont_FT as in equation (1) with λK = λE. Alternatively, for c=0, the system
becomes a series system where the failure of any Controller/Entertainment Server
causes the failure of the control function. In equations (5) through (9), if c=0 then
Rcont_FT = e-4λt. This is the reliability of a series system with 4 identical components
and each component has a failure rate of λ.

30

III.3.2. EFFICIENCY OF ERROR DETECTION/RECONFIGURATION
MECHANISMS
The model described in the previous section is very conservative. In the previous
model, it is assumed that the failure of any component can lead to a system failure if
the recovery is not successful. A more realistic scenario is studied. Let K1 and K2 be
the controllers in the two wagons. Also, let E1 and E2 be the two entertainment
servers. Assume that the recovery strategy is as follows: When one of the controllers
(K1 or K2) fails, the control function is switched to the other controller. This other
controller handles the control function of both wagons. As a precautionary measure,
the entertainment in both wagons is shut down. The system will now consist of one
controller handling the control function of both wagons while E1 and E2 are in hot
stand-by mode [48]. If the remaining controller fails, the control function is switched
to one of the entertainment servers. A system failure occurs when the second
entertainment server fails.
If the first entertainment server to fail is E1 (or E2), it is realistic to assume that the
entertainment is shut down in wagon 1 (or wagon 2) without affecting the control
function. Based on these assumptions, the Markov model in Figure 17 has to be
modified to reflect the new scenario. Figure 19 shows the improved model. Again,
any state indicates the operational components in that state. Remember that λE is the
failure rate of the Entertainment Server and λK is the failure rate of the Controller.
The initial state is 2K2E. This is the fault free (FF) state; both controllers and both
entertainment servers are operational. A failure of one of the controllers takes the
system to state 1K2E. This transition will only occur if the recovery is successful and
the operational controller is able to take over the tasks of the failed controller and
handle the entire control function in both wagons. This is why the transition rate from
state 2K2E to state 1K2E is 2cλK. If the recovery is not successful, the control
function fails and the system moves to state F (i.e., the control function failure state)
at a rate of 2λK(1-c). Also, a failure of one of the Entertainment servers moves the
model to state 2K1E. Since two servers can fail, the transition rate from 2K2E to
2K1E is 2λE. The coverage does not affect this transition as mentioned in the
assumptions leading to this more realistic scenario.
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In state 1K2E, a failure of one of the two entertainment servers moves the system
to state 1K1E at a rate of 2λE. The failure of the remaining operational controller takes
the system to state 2E at a rate of cλK and to state F at a rate of (1-c)λK.
In state 2K1E, the failure of K1 or K2 moves the system to state 1K1E; the
transition rate is 2cλK. If the recovery is not successful, the system moves to state F at
a rate of 2λK(1-c). The failure of the remaining Entertainment server takes the system
to state 2K at a rate of λE. Here again, the recovery process is not involved because
the entertainment is shut off and the control function is not affected.
In state 2K, E1 and E2 have failed but the control function has not been affected
since K1 and K2 are both operational. If either K1 or K2 fails, the model moves to state
1K; the control of both wagons is handled by the remaining operational controller.
The coverage affects this transition and therefore, the transition rate from 2K to 1K is
2cλK; also, the transition from 2K to F is 2(1-c)λK.
In state 2E, both controllers have already failed and one the Entertainment Servers
is controlling both wagons. If either E1 or E2 fails, the control function is switched to
the remaining operational server. Here again, the coverage is involved in the transition
as shown in Figure 19.
In state 1K1E, the situation is more complex. One Entertainment Server has
already failed as well as one of the controllers. The remaining controller is in charge
of the control function of both wagons and the entertainment is turned off in both
wagons. The remaining entertainment server acts as a hot stand-by for the remaining
controller. If the server fails first, the system moves to state 1K without affecting the
control function; consequently, the transition rate from 1K1E to 1K is λE. However, if
the controller fails before the Entertainment Server, the control function is switched to
the Entertainment Server and the coverage affects the transition; the transition rate
from state 1K1E to state 1E is cλK and the one from 1K1E to F is (1-c)λK.
Finally, in state 1E, the failure of the remaining entertainment server causes a
system failure at a rate of λE. The same argument applies for state 1K where the
failure of the remaining Controller causes a system failure at a rate of λk.
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Figure 19: Realistic Markov Model

The system can again be described by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. The
•

row vectors P (t ) and P(t ) are:
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and the transition matrix T is:
0
232
22
0
−2 − 2
0
0
0
0

0
2
0
−22
0
0
0
0
0

232
0
−22 − 2
0
0
0
0
0
0

22
−2 − 22
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1−2(2 + 2 )
0
0
0
0
0
0
)= 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
/

0
0
0
232
2
0
−2
0
0

0
0
32
0
0
−22
0
0
0

2(1 − 3)2
2(1 − 3)2
(1 − 3)2
2(1 − 3)2
(1 − 3)2
2(1 − 3)2
2
2
0

0
0
0
0
32
232
0
−2
0

6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4

Given that the system starts in state 2K2E, these differential equations can be
solved and the probabilities of being in each of the model states will be as follows:
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Figure 20 compares Rcont_FT for the two models: the conservative model in Figure
17 and the improved model in Figure 19. Several values of the coverage parameter are
used. For all these values, the reliability is higher in the improved model. Note that
the difference between Rcont_FT|c=0.9 for the realistic model and Rcont_FT|c=0.95 for the
conservative model, is very small. All calculations were verified using the SHARPE
program [57].

Figure 20: Effect of Coverage in Realistic Model
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IV. HYBRID NETWORK MODEL AND CONTROLLER

HIERARCHICAL ARCHITECTURE
IV.1. HYBRID CONTROL NETWORK MODEL
The previously simulated models used only one sampling period per scenario,
either 1ms or 16ms, which is unrealistic. In an actual train wagon a combination of
different sampling periods are present. Additionally, the simulated sen:act is constant
to be 1: 1 while in an actual train wagon the sen:act is not constant.
The new proposed model in this section utilizes the same Gigabit Ethernet
infrastructure used previously without modifications based on the IEEE 802.3
standard [31] for the whole network. It also follows the regulations described in IEC
61375 train standard [42, 59]. Several sampling periods are mentioned in the standard,
concerning the SAs, however the most common values are 1ms and 16ms [42].
According to the train network standard, 16ms sampling period is the most used
within a train wagon, while 1ms is the smallest sampling period within a wagon [42].
The new model incorporates both sampling periods in a single control network,
representing the different possible applications of SAs requiring different sampling
periods [58].
A typical number of SAs on a single train wagon is around 250 with sampling
periods 1ms (minority) and 16ms (majority) [42]. These will be broken down into 3
groups. Group 1 (G1) consists of 30 sensors and 30 actuators (1:1 ratio) operating
with the most demanding sampling period of 1ms. Group 2 (G2) consistes of 100
sensors and 50 actuators (2:1 ratio) operating at 16ms sampling period. Finally, Group
3 (G3) also operating at 16ms sampling period, consists of 30 sensors and 10
actuators (3:1 ratio).
This design minimizes the number of switches, using standard 128 port switches,
readily available in the market. Also note that the locations of the SAs had been
chosen to increase the distance between the switches and the controller, maximizing
the trip distance to simulate a worst case scenario. The main switch (MS1) utilizes a
forwarding rate of 6.6Mbps.
The entertainment load in the train model can be described in terms of the number
of streams, the quality of the video screens as well as the number of Wi-Fi nodes and
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the number of applications per node. In the worst case scenario, in a large wagon of
60 seats [41], the network supported 60 different and simultaneously played video
streams (one per seat), as well as one Wi-Fi user per seat. Each Wi-Fi user run several
simultaneous applications: Database access, email, web browsing and file transfer.
This gives a total of 60 Video streams and 60 Wi-Fi users, running 4 simultaneous
applications requiring access to the network. The Wi-Fi access is provided via the
Access Point (AP) in the middle of the wagon, maximizing coverage area. The
network distribution is illustrated in Figure 21.
Figure 21: Hybrid one wagon train network model

The applications used for the Wi-Fi nodes are the generic heavy applications builtin OPNET. The video streaming applications had to be custom set to allow DVD
quality streaming. DVD quality videos are available in a variety of formats, utilizing
different levels of compression and encoding to decrease file size on disk. In previous
scenarios uncompressed DVD quality was used. However, to further mimic a realistic
model a compressed DVD video stream is simulated in this hybrid model. Streaming
a DVD quality file requires a broadband connection ranging from 450Kb/s to 3.5Mb/s
depending on the resolution [60]. In the worst case scenario, it took the full length of
the film to stream the actual file from the hard disk. This means that the video can

37

experience significant lag if there are any lost packets. In order to avoid such a case, a
streaming rate of 5Mb/s is used instead of 3.5Mb/s.

IV.1.1. SIMULATION OUTCOMES
The hybrid model proposed simualtes a single wagon model with 60 video streams
and 60 Wi-Fi users. The first scenario simulates the fault free case, where both servers
are fully functional; K1 handling all control data and E1 handling the entertainment
load. In the second scenario (fault tolerant), one of the two controllers fails. The
traffic, now both control and entertainment, is handled by the remaining server while
maximizing the number of video streams and Wi-Fi users, without jeopardizing the
control load.
In order to gauge the performance of the system, end-to-end delay and packet loss
must be monitored. In all simulations, zero packet loss (no packets dropped or
delayed) is observed and total end-to-end delays across all SAs are within their
respective constraints (37). A 95% confidence analysis is applied to all results.
Figures 22 and 23 show examples of the results obtained from different scenarios. In
all figures, the x-axis represents the simulation time in minutes and seconds, while the
y-axis shows the delay in seconds. With all video streams at DVD quality and all WiFi users running the full load of applications described above, the maximum total endto-end delay (with a 95% confidence) for each group of SAs is shown in Table 2.
These results guarantee that all SAs operating with a sampling period of 1ms have
an end-to-end delay of less than 1ms, and those operating at 16ms have an end-to-end
delay of less than 16ms (with 95% confidence). Note that the number of Wi-Fi users
is found to be unaffected due to the fact that the load (restricted to 6Mbps) is not
comparable to the control or the video streaming loads.

Table 2: Hybrid Model - One Wagon - total end-to-end delays (µs)

No. of
Operational
Servers

Control End-to-End Delay
(µs)
G1
G2
G3

No of Video
Streams

No of Wi-Fi
Users

2

0.010

0.011

0.011

60

60

1

0.751

0.870

0.876

6

60
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Figure 22: Hybrid model - One Wagon - FF - K to A delay (G1)

Figure 23: Hybrid model - One Wagon – FF - K to A delay (G3)
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IV.2. HIERARCHICAL ARCHITECTURE AT THE
CONTROLLER LEVEL
For the purpose of this study, two of the one wagon model are combined to form a
two wagon unit interconnected using the intermediate switch with a supervisory
server (Supervisor) connected to this switch as well [61]. This unit can be considered
as the main building unit of the train such as the Siemens Desiro diesel or electric
multiple unit (DMU or EMU) [62]. A full train can be formulated by conencting
several of this two-wagons building unit. All the main switches and the intermediate
switch have a forwarding rate of 6.6Mbps which is much lower than the rate of the
switches available in the market such as the Cisco Catalyst 3560 Gigabit Ethernet
switch [50].
Video streams and Wi-Fi applications represent the entertainment load within the
train network. The quality of the video streams used is the standardized compressed
DVD quality with a speed of 5MBps [46]. Since, a wagon has a maximum of 60 seats,
60 video streams are run simultaneously on video screens connected to the main
switch of each wagon [41]. The Wi-Fi load is simulated using 60 Wi-Fi laptops (1
laptop/seat) connected to each wagon main switch via a wireless router. These laptops
are running the same four applications: HTTP, FTP, DB, and Email. Figure 24, shows
the two wagons train unit network design.

Figure 24: Two-Wagon Unit Network Model with a Supervisor Node
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The model has two dedicated controllers per wagon. W1 has K1 and E1, where K1
was a controller, handling the control load only, and E1 is the entertainment server.
The same is true for W2.
To further increase safety on board of the train, a fault tolerance hierarchal model
at the controller level is introduced. In each train wagon there are two Servers, the
Controller and the Entertainment server representing the first step in the hierarchical
model. There is a watchdog signal between all four servers (two Controllers and two
Entertainments Servers) every 1ms with a 32 byte packet size. The next level of the
controller hierarchy is a Passive Supervisor (S) in each two-wagon unit receiving the
same watchdog signal from all four Servers.
To enhance network reliability, the Entertainment Server acts as a backup for the
same wagon Controller. In case a Controller (K) fails, the Entertainment Server (E) of
the same wagon drops the entertainment load and handles the control load only. The
Entertainment Server will detect the failure of the Controller when it does not receive
the watchdog signal from the Controller. In case the Entertainment Server failed the
entertainment load is dropped. This conservative approach is followed to ensure the
safety of the train operation. In order for the Entertainment Server to take over the
control load, the sensors in both wagons send their data to all four servers while only
the one handling the control load made decision and send the control words to the
corresponding actuators.
In case both the Controller and the Entertainment Server of a wagon fail, the
Entertainment server of the other wagon (Wj) will drop the entertainment load and
would carry the Control load of the first wagon (Wi). If further problems occurr in
which the Controller or the Entertainment Server of Wj failed, the remaining Server
(Controller or Entertainment Server) will carry the control load of Wj and all the
entertainment would be dropped while the Passive Supervisor would come into action
and carry the Control load of Wi. The Supervisor will carry the control load of both
wagons if all 4 servers failed. For the Supervisor to handle the control load, the
sensors of both wagons start sending their data to the Supervisor after the failure of
two servers.
In order for this algorithm to succeed, there is an assumption that the reliability of
the Supervisor is higher than that of the four servers and hence it would fail last.
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In order to improve the security within the train, four door-cameras per wagon
have been added to the network, one camera at each door [63]. Each camera transmit
a video stream to the Supervisor to be monitored by the train driver. The video
streams are simulated using the low quality video conferencing OPNET default
application. This quality runs ar a rate of 15 frames /second, each of has 9 bits /pixel
and 128×240 pixels resolution. This door-camera streaming is never dropped in case
of any server failure.
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IV.2.1. UNIQUE SIMULATED SCENARIOS IN PASSIVE
SUPERVISOR
Since there are 5 servers in the network (2 Controllers, 2 Entertianment Servers
and one Supervisor), then there are 5! = 120 possible failure paths the network can go
through. However, as it’s assumed that the Supervisor is the most reliable node of all
5 servers and that it would fail last, there are only 4! = 24 possible failure paths as
shown below. Each state represent the operational servers in the two wagon network.
Also, State E2S_W2 refers to the situation where E2 and S are the only operational
servers while E2 is carrying the Load of W2. State E2S_W1 refers to the situation
where E2 and S are the only operational servers while E2 is carrying the Load of W1.
The same applies to states E1S_W1 and E1S_W2. The different paths are shown below:
4

Figure 25: Network Failure Paths in Passive
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Figure 26: Network Failure Paths in Passive Supervisor (Cont'd)
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In the above paths, there are 18 different states (other than the failure state) that the
network goes through, which are:
1. K1K2E1E2S

2. K2E1E2S

3. K1E1E2S

4. K1K2E2S

5. K1K2E1S

6. E1E2S

7. K2E2S

8. K2E1S

9. K1E2S

10. K1E1S

11. K1K2S

12. K1S

13. K2S

14. E1S_ W1

15. E1S_ W2

16. E2S_ W1

17. E2S_ W2

18. S

Since the two-wagons network model is symmetric, then several of these states are
similar. For example, the state K1K2E2S and state K1K2E1S are similar where is one
wagon with controller failed and the other wagon is fault free. Consquently, there are
11 unique states/scenarios which are analyzed using OPNET; any further scenario can
be related to one of the analyzed scenarios. In all these scenarios, the Supervisor is
running otherwise the whole network will fail since it was considered the last node to
fail.
The scenarios are as follow (i and j represent the wagon number to be either 1 or 2
interchangeably):
•

Scenario 1: The fault free state in which are 4 servers are functioning
(KiKjEiEjS).

•

Scenario 2: One Controller fails (Wj) and the other 3 servers are up and
running (KiEiEjS). In this case the Entertainment Server of the same wagon
(Wj) would carry its control load.

•

Scenario 3: One Entertainment Server fails and the other 3 servers are up and
running (KiKjEiS).

•

Scenario 4: The Controller and the Entertainment Server of the same wagon
(Wj) fail (KiEiS). The Entertainment Server of the other wagon (Wi) will drop
its entertainment load and carry the control load of Wi.

•

Scenario 5: The Controller of Wj and the Entertainment Server of Wi fail or
vice versa (KiEjS). The control load of Wj will be handled by the Entertainment
Server of Wj.

•

Scenario 6: The Entertainment Servers of both wagons fail (KiKjS). Then the
enterainmemt load is dropped and no change happens to the control load.

45

•

Scenario 7: The Controllers of both wagons fail (EiEjS). The Entertainment
Server of each wagon shall carry the control load of its own wagon and drop its
entertainment load.

•

Scenario 8: The Entertainment Servers of both wagons fail and the Controller
of one wagon (Wj) fails (KiS). The Supervisor will carry the control load of Wj
while the Controller Wi will carry its own control load.

•

Scenario 9: The Entertainment Server of one wagon fails (Wj) and both
Controllers fail in which Controller of wagon Wi fails before the Controller of
wagon Wj. The Entertainment Server will carry its own wagon control load
(Wi) while the supervisor carries the other wagon (Wj) control load (EiS_Wi).

•

Scenario 10: The Entertainment Server of one wagon fail (Wj) and both
Controllers fail in which Controller of wagon Wj fails before the Controller of
wagon Wi. The Entertainment Server will carry the control load of the other
wagon (Wj) while the supervisor carries the first wagon (Wi) control load
(EiS_Wj).

•

Scenario 11: All 4 servers fail, and leave the Supervisor carrying the control
load of both wagons (S).
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IV.2.1.1. SIMULATION RESULTS WITH PASSIVE SUPERVISOR
Adding a passive fault tolerant hierarchal model at the Controller level is a method
to further improve the network reliability. The main performance metric is still the
control packet end-to-end delay for all the sensors and actuators. This delay should
not exceed the corresponding sensor/actuator sampling period [37]. Additionally, the
rate of packet loss has been monitored. The OPNET simulations have proved zero
packet loss, i.e., there are no dropped or delayed packets in the system. A 95%
confidence analysis is applied to all results. The delay for the door-cameras as well as
the entertainment load (if present) have been observed and the results showed that
they are always within the acceptable limits to avoid video flickering (in case of doorcamera or video streaming) and to avoid user frustration due to long response time
regarding the Wi-Fi services. Figures 27 to 29 show a sample of OPNET results from
different scenarios.
As previously mentioned the X-axis represent the simulation time in minutes and
the Y-axis represent the delay in seconds in the OPNET figures below. Also, the red
dots indicate the end-to-end delay from the acting Controller/Server to the actuator
node and the blue dots indicate the end-to-end delay from the sensor to the Controller.
The total packet end-to-end delay is the sum of both delays.
Figure 27: Passive - KiKjEiEjS control end-to-end delay – G3
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Figure 28: Passive - KiKjS control end-to-end delay - G2

Figure 29: Passive - End-to-end delay with S operational – G1
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Table 3 illustrates the output of the OPNET simulations. The end-to-end delay for
the 1ms sensors/actuators is found to be below 1ms and the end-to-end delay of the
16ms sensors and actuators is proved to be below 16ms. The presence of the
entertainment load is indicated in the below table with the wagon name that it is
running in. As previously mentioned, the entertainment load per wagon consists of 60
video streaming and 60 Wi-Fi laptops running 4 different applications; HTTP, FTP,
DB, and email. The presented delays include all processing, propagation,
encapsulation and de-capsulation delays. The delay for the door-cameras as well as
the entertainment load (if present) have been observed and the results showed that
they are always with the acceptable limits to avoid video flickering (in case of doorcamera or video streaming) and to avoid user frustration due to long response time
regarding the Wi-Fi services.
Table 3: Passive Supervisor total end-to-end delays (µs)

Scenarios

Server handling
Control load
Wi
Wj

Control End-to-End Delay
(µs)
G1
G2
G3

Entertainment
Enabled in
Wagon

KiKjEiEjS

Ki

Kj

33.2

34.6

20.5

Wi and Wj

KiEiEjS

Ki

Ei

17.3

16.8

17.7

Wi

KiKjEiS

Ki

Kj

18.6

15.1

17.4

Wi

KiEiS

Ki

Ei

15.3

16.7

9.2

-

KiEjS

Ki

Ej

14.1

16.5

9.2

-

KiKjS

Ki

Kj

15.2

14.3

16.6

-

EiEjS

Ei

Ej

15.2

14.3

16.7

-

KiS

Ki

S

10.5

13.2

12.4

-

EiS_Wi

Ei

S

10.5

13.2

12.3

-

EiS_Wj

S

Ei

10.2

14.9

12.5

-

S

S

S

12.4

11.3

9.2

-

All the results were obtained after a 95% confidence analysis. The results shown
represent the mean value of the maximum packet end-to-end delay obtained from all
runs. Furthermore, the delays for the door-cameras and the video streaming were
below the acceptable delay requirements. As per [64], the OPNET results presented in
this research are comparable to hardware implementation outcomes as the maximum
transmission rate for the control load is 0.256 Mbps
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V. ACTIVE SUPERVISOR AND RELIABILITY
MODELING
V.1. HYBRID NETWORK MODEL WITH ACTIVE
SUPERVISOR
In this study, the same network architecture modeled in the previous chapter is
used for comparison purposes. Two of the one-wagon networks are connected
together via the intermediate switch using a 10GbE link. The supervisor is connected
to the intermediate switch. In each wagon there are 250 SAs. These SAs are divided
in to three groups G1, G2 and G3. In group G1, there is a 1:1 sen:act running at a
sampling period of 1ms. The nodes in G2 and G3 are running at a sampling period of
16 ms with a 1:2 sen:act and 1:3 sen:act respectively. The nodes are located at
positions that would ensure maximum propagation and therefore maximum end-toend delay [65].
All nodes within a wagon are connected to the wagon’s MS using a GbE links. The
IS, and both MSs have a forwarding rate of 6.6Mpps. The entertainment load is the
same as in the previous chapter. It consists of 60 Wi-Fi nodes as well as 60
compressed DVD video streams running at a rate of 5Mbps [46]. This means that for
each seat of the wagon 60 seats has a Wi-Fi laptop and a video stream running [41].
The two-wagon train unit network model is in Figure 30.
In each wagon, there are 2 operational Servers in case of FF state; one Controller
(K) and one Entertainment Server (E). They handle the control and the entertainment
loads of the wagon respectively. All five servers (two Controllers, two entertainment
server and one supervisor) know the state of the other server through sharing a
watchdog signal of 32 bytes that is sent every 1ms. Moreover, there are 4 cameras per
wagon located at each door to enhance safety [63]. They send video signals directly to
the Supervisor for safety monitoring purposes by the train driver. The reliability of the
Supervisor is still assumed to be the highest as in the previous chapter to ensure it has
the lowest probability of failure and, therefore the longest lifetime for comparison
purposes.
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Figure 30: Two wagon train model with Active Supervisor

Active Supervisor
Unlike in the previous chapter, the Supervisor acts as an Active Supervisor. This
means that the supervisor acts as the primary backup to the Controllers (Ks) in each
wagon. If the Controller in either wagon fails, the Supervisor handles the control load
of the wagon immediately. Additionally, in case the Controller of the second wagon
fails, the Supervisor in such case will handle the control load of both wagons.
The fault-tolerance relation between the Controllers in both wagons is no longer
present, i.e., they no longer carry each other’s control load. Furthermore, the
Entertainment Servers do not act as backups to the Controllers and do not handle any
control load unlike the presented case in the previous chapter. The same conservative
approach in regard to entertainment services is followed; if the Entertainment Server
of any wagon fails, the entertainment services within that wagon are dropped due to
the high safety requirements in train operations. However, the Entertainment Server
does not drop the entertainment load to handle any control load.
As the Supervisor is the only backup node to the Controllers; the sensors send their
data only to their corresponding Controller and to the Supervisor. So, for example, the
sensors in w1 only send their data to K1 and the Supervisor only as these are the only
nodes to handle the control load.
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V.1.1. UNIQUE SIMULATED SCENARIOS IN ACTIVE
SUPERVISOR
The same approach used with the passive supervisor network is used in this study
to find the unique states that the network goes through. As the assumption that the
Supervisor is the last to fail, therefore, there are only 24 possible failure paths. Each
state represent the operational servers in the two wagon network. It is important to
note here that since the entertianment server no longer handles any control load so the
two states E1S_W1 and E1S_W2 now represent the same state which is E1S. The same
case is applicable for cases E2S_W1 and E2S_W2. The different paths that the network
go through are shown in the below figures:
Figure 31: Network Failure Paths in Active Supervisor
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Figure 32: Network Failure Paths in Active Supervisor (Cont'd)
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In the above paths, there are 16 different states (other than the failure state) that the
network gets through, which are:
1. K1K2E1E2S

2. K2E1E2S

3. K1E1E2S

4. K1K2E2S

5. K1K2E1S

6. E1E2S

7. K2E2S

8. K2E1S

9. K1E2S

10. K1E1S

11. K1K2S

12. K1S

13. K2S

14. E1S

15. E2S

16. S
Since the two-wagons network model is symmetric, then several of these states are
similar. For example, the state K1K2E2S and state K1K2E1S are similar where there is
one wagon with failed controller and the other wagon is fault free. Consquently, there
are 10 unique states/scenarios which had been analyzed using OPNET; any further
scenario could be related to one of the analyzed scenarios. In all these scenarios, the
Supervisor was running otherwise the whole network will fail since it was considered
the last node to fail.
The scenarios are as follow (i and j represent the wagon number to be either 1 or 2
interchangeably):
•

Scenario 1: The fault free state in which 4 servers are functioning (KiKjEiEjS)

•

Scenario 2: One Controller fails (Wj) and the other 3 servers are up and
running (KiEiEjS). In this case the supervisor will carry the control load of Wj.

•

Scenario 3: One Entertainment Server fails and the other 3 servers are up and
running (KiKjEiS). The enteraiment load in Wj is dropped.

•

Scenario 4: The Controller and the Entertainment Server of the same wagon
(Wj) fail (KiEiS). The Entertainment Server of the other wagon (Wi) will drop
its entertainment load and the Supervisor will carry the control load of Wi.

•

Scenario 5: The Controller of Wj and the Entertainment Server of Wi fail or
vice versa (KiEjS). The control load of Wj will be handled by the Supervisor.

•

Scenario 6: The Entertainment Servers of both wagons fail (KiKjS). Then the
enterainmemt load in both wagons is dropped and no change happen to the
control load.

•

Scenario 7: The Controllers of both wagons fail (EiEjS). the Supervisor carry
the control load of both wagons.
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•

Scenario 8: The Entertainment Servers of both wagons fail and the Controller
of one wagon (Wj) fails (KiS). The Supervisor will carry the control load of Wj
while the Controller Ki will carry its own control load

•

Scenario 9: The Entertainment Server of one wagon fails (Wj) and its
entertianemnt load is dropped. Also, both Controllers fail and the Supervisor
will carry the control load of both wagons. Tthe entertainment server in Wi is
still handling its entertainment load (EiS).

•

Scenario 10: All 4 servers fail, and left the Supervisor carrying the control load
of both wagons (S).
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V.1.1.1. SIMULATION RESULTS WITH ACTIVE SUPERVISOR
Adding an active fault tolerant hierarchal model at the Controller level is a method
to further improve the network reliability. The main performance metric is still the
control packet end-to-end delay for all the sensors and actuators. This delay should
not exceed the corresponding sensor/actuator sampling period [37]. Additionally, the
rate of packet loss has been monitored. The OPNET simulations have proved zero
packet loss, i.e., there are no dropped or delayed packets in the system. A 95%
confidence analysis is applied to all results. The delay for the door-cameras as well as
the entertainment load (if present) have been observed and the results showed that
they are always with the acceptable limits to avoid video flickering (in case of doorcamera or video streaming) and to avoid user frustration due to long response time
regarding the Wi-Fi services. Figures 33 to 35 show a sample of OPNET results from
different scenarios.
As previously mentioned the X-axis represent the simulation time in minutes and
the Y-axis represent the delay in seconds in the OPNET figures below. Also, the red
dots indicate the end-to-end delay from the acting Controller/Server to the actuator
node and the blue dots indicate the end-to-end delay from the sensor to the Controller.
The total packet end-to-end delay is the sum of both delays.
Figure 33: Active - KiKjEiEjS Control end-to-end delay – G2
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Figure 34: Active - KiKjS control end-to-end – G3

Figure 35: Active - End-to-end delay with only S operational (S) – G2
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In the passive supervisor, there were 11 scenarios simulated while here, only 10
states are simulated. This is due to the fact that, in the passive supervisor case
scenario EiS appeared twice as EiS_Wi and EiS_Wj. In the first case the Entertainment
Server (Ei) was carrying the control load of Wagon Wi, while in the second case, it
was carrying the control load of the other Wagon Wj. As the Entertainment Server in
the active supervisor case does not handle any control load, consequently, both cases
end up being identical. In the active case, the supervisor node carries the control load
of both wagons in case of controllers’ failure while each entertainment server handles
its own wagon entertainment load.
Table 4 illustrates the output of the OPNET simulations. The end-to-end delay for
the 1ms sensors/actuators is found to be below 1ms and the end-to-end delay of the
16ms sensors and actuators is proved to be below 16ms. The presence of
entertainment load is indicated in the below table with the wagon name that it is
running in. As previously mentioned, the entertainment load per wagon consists of 60
video streaming and 60 Wi-Fi laptops running 4 different applications; HTTP, FTP,
DB, and email. The presented delays include all processing, propagation,
encapsulation and de-capsulation delays.
Table 4: Active Supervisor total end-to-end delays (µs)

Scenarios

Server handling
Control load
Wi
Wj

Control End-to-End Delay
(µs)
G1
G2
G3

Entertainment
Enabled in
Wagon

KiKjEiEjS

Ki

Kj

26.55

14.24

21.14

Wi and Wj

KiEiEjS

Ki

S

17.12

12.22

19.12

Wi and Wj

KiKjEiS

Ki

Kj

17.98

13.22

15.99

Wi

KiEiS

Ki

S

14.41

11.63

16.45

Wi

KiEjS

Ki

S

9.77

11.50

9.50

Wj

KiKjS

Ki

Kj

15.07

12.18

15.71

-

EiEjS

S

S

17.02

12.17

17.98

Wi and Wj

KiS

Ki

S

11.85

11.76

12.54

-

EiS

S

S

9.36

11.33

9.10

Wi

S

S

S

12.4

11.3

9.2

-
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All the results were obtained after a 95% confidence analysis. The results shown
represent the mean value of the maximum packet end-to-end delay obtained from all
runs. The maximum deviation (∆) from these means is 0.411µs. Furthermore, the
delays for the door-cameras and the video streaming were below the acceptable delay
requirements. As per [64], the OPNET results presented in this research are
comparable to hardware implementation outcomes as the maximum transmission rate
for the control load is 0.256 Mbps.
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V.1.2. PASSIVE AND ACTIVE SUPERVISOR OUTCOMES
COMPARISON
In the network model with the active supervisor, the sensors send their data to their
corresponding controller and the supervisor node only rather than sending 4 different
streams to all Servers. Therefore, the delay is lower in the Active supervisor
architecture in the fault-free scenario (KiKjEiEjS).
In other scenarios such as KiEiEjS, the Controller node (Ki) carries the control load
of wagon Wi while the Entertainment Server (Ej) has dropped its entertainment load
and is handling the control load of Wj in the passive supervisor mode. With the active
supervisor, since Ej does not drop its entertainment load, S handles the control load of
wagon Wj. Hence, the passenger can still enjoy the on-board services and will not be
affected by the failure that occurred.
Also, in case of EiEjS in the active model, the supervisor S handles the control load
of both wagons but the entertainment services are still running in both wagons. In the
passive supervisor case, each of the Entertainment Servers carries its own wagon
control load after dropping its entertainment load. Therefore, the delay in the Active
Supervisor case is somewhat higher when compared to the Passive supervisor case,
due to the introduced latency caused by the video stream and Wi-Fi packets within the
network fabric.
In scenario (S), the delay is the same in the active or passive models since all the
entertainment is dropped in both cases and the sensors only send their data to the
supervisor. This is verified by observing the forwarded traffic by the intermediate
switch, in which the same amount of traffic (133.9Mbps) is forwarded in both cases.
The main benefit when comparing the active supervisor case to the passive
supervisor case presented is that the passenger will not be aware of a failure except
when the entertainment server of the wagon fails. This case is valid in scenarios
KiKjEiEjS, KiEiEjS and EiEjS; in these three states, the entertainment is functional in
both wagons, other than when compared with the passive supervisor case. On the
other hand, in the passive scenario, the entertainment is functional in both wagons in
the fault free scenario only. This means that when only one server fails, the passenger
will be aware of the failure in case of the passive supervisor. Also, only one wagon
will experience the failure of the entertainment in the active case in scenarios KiKjEiS,
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KiEiS, KiEjS, and EiS. When comparing with the passive scenario, the passengers will
enjoy the entertainment services in one wagon in scenarios KiEiEiS and KiKjEiS only.
Table 5 shows a comparison between the Active Supervisor architecture and the
passive Supervisor architecture with respect to the number of states that have the
entertainment enabled in either one or two wagons. Due to the symmetric nature of
the network, the states: KiEiEjS, KiKjEiS, KiEiS, KiEjS, KiS and EiS are duplicated.
Consequently, in the Active Supervisor architecture, the 10 states are expanded to 16
and, in the Passive Supervisor architecture; the 11 states are expanded to 18.
Note finally that, in the Active Supervisor architecture, when the controller of a
wagon fails, its only backup is the Supervisor node. In the passive supervisor network
model, for each failing controller, there are 4 other machines that act as backups.
Table 5: Number of states with enabled Entertainment

Entertainment enabled in

Passive Supervisor

Active Supervisor

2 Wagons

1/18 states

4/16 states

1 Wagon

4/18 states

8/16 states
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V.2. MARKOV MODELING AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
COMPARISON
After proving that both network models, with a passive and active supervisor, meet
the control end-to-end delay requirement, the important finding is which scenario is
better performing. The way to discover the better performing scenario is through
analyzing the reliability of both systems and comparing them.
In analyzing the reliability of both scenarios, it was important to note that the
switching of the control tasks from a failed Server to another operational server is not
always a successful process. Therefore, the probability of successful detection/
reconfiguration, i.e the coverage, is included in the Markov models [48, 49, 55, 56].
As previously mentioned, the coverage is defined as the proportion of faults from
which a system can automatically recover [53]. Figure 36 shows the Markov model
for the network model with passive supervisor.
Figure 36: Passive Supervisor - Markov Model
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In the above model, each state indicates the operational servers within the network.
Any state where the Supervisor fails before any other node is considered a failure
state. This is because the train driver or observer cannot supervise the network
behavior and therefore is in a failure state of supervising the network. Moreover, λK,
λE and λS represent the failure rate of the Controller, Entertainment server and the
supervisor respectively. The coverage c appears in the transitions between states
where the control function will be shifted from one failed server to another
operational one. This transition will only occur if the recovery is successful and the
operational controller is able to take over the tasks of the failed controller and handle
the control function. If the recovery is not successful, the control function fails and the
system moves to state F (i.e., the control function failure state).
The initial state is the fault-free (FF) state where all servers are operational. If one
of the Controllers fails (Kj), the system moves to state KiEiEjS with a transition rate of
2cλK. The factor of 2 is due to the fact that the failure of either K1 or K2 will lead to
this state. In case one of the entertainment servers fails instead, the system moves to
the KiKjEiS state at a rate of 2λE. Here, the coverage is not included in the transition
rate as there is no shifting of any control function. In case the supervisor fails or
during the shift from the FF state to the KiEiEjS the recovery of the control function
was unsuccessful, the system directly goes to the failure state at a transition rate of
2(1-c)λK+λS.
In the state KiEiEjS when the remaining controller fails, the system transits to the
EiEjS at a rate of cλK. If Ei fails, it moves to the KiEjS state at a rate of λE, while if Ej
fails, the system transits to the KiEiS state with a transition rate of cλE. Note here that
incase of failure of Ki or Ej only the coverage is included as those transitions include
shifting of the control function to Ei. If the control function is not reconfigured
successfully or the supervisor fails, the system fails to the failure state at a rate of (1c)λK+(1-c)λE+λS.
In the state KiKjEiS when the controller Ki fails, the system transits to the KiEjS at
a rate of cλK. If Kj fails, it moves to the KiEiS state at a rate of cλK, while if Ei fails,
the system transits to the KiKjS state with a transition rate of λE. Note here that incase
of failure of Ki or Kj only the coverage is included as those transitions include shifting
of the control function to Ei or Ej respectively. If the control function is not
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reconfigured successfully or the supervisor fails, the system fails to the failure state at
a rate of 2(1-c)λK+λS.
In state EiEjS, Ki and Kj have failed and the control function has been shifted to Ei
and Ej respectively. If either Ei or Ej fails, the model moves to state EiS_Wi; the
control of Wi is handled by Ei and the control load of Wj is handled by S. The
coverage affects this transition and therefore, the transition rate from EiEjS to EiS_Wi
to is 2cλE; also, the transition from EiEjS to failure is 2(1-c)λE+λS.
In state KiKjS, Ei and Ej have failed but the control function has not been affected
since Ki and Kj are both operational. If either Ki or Kj fails, the model moves to state
KiS; the control of failed controller is handled by S. The coverage affects this
transition and therefore, the transition rate from KiKjS to KiS is 2cλK; also, the
transition from KiKjS to F is 2(1-c)λK+λS.
In the state KiEiS when the controller Ki fails, the system transits to the EiS_Wj at a
rate of cλK. If Ei fails, it moves to the KiS state at a rate of cλE. Note here that incase
of failure of Ki or Ei only the coverage is included as those transitions include shifting
of the control function to S. If the control function is not reconfigured successfully or
the supervisor fails, the system fails to the failure state at a rate of (1-c)λK+(1-c)λE+λS.
Similarly, in the state KiEjS when the controller Ki fails, the system transits to the
EiS_Wi at a rate of cλK. If Ej fails, it moves to the KiS state at a rate of cλE. In case of
failure of Ki or Ej, the coverage is included as those transitions include shifting of the
control function to S. If the control function is not reconfigured successfully or the
supervisor fails, the system fails at a rate of (1-c)λK+(1-c)λE+λS.
In states KiS, EiS_Wi and EiS_Wj, when the operational server other than the
supervisor fail, namely Ki or Ei, the system moves to the S state at a rate of cλK, cλE or
cλE in that order. In case of non-recovery of the control function, or failure of S, the
system fails with a rate of (1-c)λK+2λS, (1-c)λE+2λS or (1-c)λE+2λS in the same order.
When the system is in state S and the supervisor fail it moves to the failure state at a
rate of λS.
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The system can be described by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. The row
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The active supervisor network Markov model is shown in figure 37.
Figure 37: Active Supervisor - Markov Model

Similar to the passive Markov model, each state indicates the operational servers
within the network. Also, the same assumption is still valid; in case that the
Supervisor fails before any other node; it is considered a failure state. Additionally,
λK, λE and λS represent the failure rate of the Controller, Entertainment server and
the supervisor respectively. Consistently, the coverage c appears in the transitions
between states where the control function will be shifted from one failed server to
another operational one.
The initial state is the FF state where are servers are operational. If one of the
Controllers fails (Kj), the system moves to state KiEiEjS with a transition rate of 2cλK.
The factor of 2 is due to the fact that the failure of either K1 or K2 will lead to this
state. In case one of the entertainment servers fails instead, the system moves to the
KiKjEiS state at a rate of 2λE. Here, the coverage is not included in the transition rate
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as there is no shifting of any control function. In case the supervisor fails or during the
shift from the FF state to the KiEiEjS the recovery of the control function was
unsuccessful, the system directly goes to the failure state at a transition rate of 2(1c)λK+λS.
In the state KiEiEjS when the remaining controller fails, the system transits to the
EiEjS at a rate of cλK. If Ei fails, it moves to the KiEjS state at a rate of λE, while if Ej
fails, the system transits to the KiEiS state with a transition rate of λE. Note here that
incase of failure of Ki only the coverage is included as those transitions include
shifting of the control function to S. If the control function is not reconfigured
successfully or the supervisor fails, the system fails to the failure state at a rate of (1c)λK+λS.
In the state KiKjEiS when the controller Ki fails, the system transits to the KiEjS at
a rate of cλK. If Kj fails, it moves to the KiEiS state at a rate of cλK, while if Ei fails,
the system transits to the KiKjS state with a transition rate of λE. Note here that incase
of failure of Ki or Kj only the coverage is included as those transitions include shifting
of the control function to S. If the control function is not reconfigured successfully or
the supervisor fails, the system fails to the failure state at a rate of 2(1-c)λK+λS.
In state EiEjS, Ki and Kj have failed and the control function has been shifted to S.
If either Ei or Ej fails, the model moves to state EiS; the entertainment load is dropped
in both cases with no effect on the control load handled by S. The coverage does not
affect this transition and therefore, the transition rate from EiEjS to EiS is 2λE; also,
the transition from EiEjS to the failure state is λS.
In state KiKjS, Ei and Ej have failed but the control function has not been affected
since Ki and Kj are both operational. If either Ki or Kj fails, the model moves to state
KiS; the control of failed controller is handled by S. The coverage affects this
transition and therefore, the transition rate from KiKjS to KiS is 2cλK; also, the
transition from KiKjS to F is 2(1-c)λK+λS.
In the state KiEiS when the controller Ki fails, the system transits to the EiS at a
rate of 2cλK. If Ei fails, it moves to the KiS state at a rate of λE. Note here that incase
of failure of Ki only the coverage is included as those transitions include shifting of
the control function to S. If the control function is not reconfigured successfully or the
supervisor fails, the system fails to the failure state at a rate of (1-c)λK+λS.
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Similarly, in the state KiEjS when the controller Ki fails, the system transits to the
EiS at a rate of cλK. If Ej fails, it moves to the KiS state at a rate of λE. Only in case of
failure of Ki, the coverage is included as those transitions include shifting of the
control function to S. If the control function is not reconfigured successfully or the
supervisor fails, the system fails at a rate of (1-c)λK+λS.
In states KiS and EiS, when Ki or Ei fail, the system moves to the S state at a rate of
cλK or λE in that order. In case of non-recovery of the control function, or failure of S,
the system fails with a rate of (1-c)λK+λS or λS respectively. When the system is in
state S and the supervisor fail it moves to the failure state at a rate of λS.
The system can be described by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. The row
•

vectors P (t ) and P(t ) are:
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V.2.1. NETWORK RELIABILITY COMPARISON
The reliability with respect to time was obtained for both models using SHARPE
software package [57]. SHARPE, (Symbolic Hierarchical Automated Reliability and
Performance Evaluator) is a tool used for analyzing systems performance. It is used
for modeling of system reliability and performability using Markov and semi-Markov
reward models as well stochastic Petri nets [57]. A case study is presented next to
illustrate the use of the Markov models in the determination of system reliability. Let
the failure rates of the controllers and the entertainment servers be the same, i.e., λK =
λE = λ = 1/month. Moreover, as the Supervisor is assumed to fail last in both cases
(passive and active modes), three different values for its failure rate were chosen for
λs= 0.5, 0.8 and 1/month.
The coverage is determined by the user and any small mistake in the calculation of
the coverage leads to false reliability estimations [49]. Moreover, if the coverage of a
system decreases, system reliability is expected to decrease as well. Consequently,
different values for the coverage were used specifically 95% and 90%.
Tables 6 and 7 show the output from SHARPE for the system reliability for all
combinations of the coverage and λs for both passive and active supervisor.
Table 6: Reliability (t) for Passive Supervisor
Time
(Month)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2

C=0.9 λs=0.5
1.00
0.93
0.87
0.81
0.76
0.71
0.66
0.62
0.58
0.54
0.51
0.48
0.45
0.42
0.40
0.37
0.35
0.33
0.31
0.30
0.28

C=0.95 λs=0.5
1.00
0.94
0.89
0.84
0.79
0.74
0.70
0.66
0.62
0.59
0.56
0.52
0.50
0.47
0.44
0.42
0.40
0.38
0.36
0.34
0.32

Passive Supervisor Model
C=0.9 C=0.95 λs=0.8
λs=0.8
1.00
1.00
0.90
0.91
0.82
0.84
0.74
0.76
0.67
0.70
0.61
0.64
0.55
0.58
0.50
0.53
0.45
0.49
0.41
0.45
0.38
0.41
0.34
0.38
0.31
0.35
0.29
0.32
0.26
0.29
0.24
0.27
0.22
0.25
0.20
0.23
0.18
0.21
0.17
0.19
0.15
0.18
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C=0.9 λs=1
1.00
0.89
0.79
0.70
0.62
0.55
0.49
0.43
0.39
0.35
0.31
0.27
0.25
0.22
0.20
0.18
0.16
0.14
0.13
0.11
0.10

C=0.95 λs=1
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.72
0.64
0.58
0.52
0.46
0.42
0.37
0.34
0.30
0.27
0.25
0.22
0.20
0.18
0.16
0.15
0.13
0.12

Table 7: Reliability (t) for Active Supervisor
Time
(Month)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2

C=0.9 λs=0.5
1.00
0.93
0.87
0.82
0.77
0.72
0.68
0.64
0.60
0.56
0.53
0.50
0.47
0.45
0.42
0.40
0.38
0.36
0.34
0.32
0.31

C=0.95 λs=0.5
1.00
0.94
0.89
0.84
0.79
0.75
0.71
0.67
0.63
0.60
0.57
0.54
0.51
0.48
0.46
0.44
0.41
0.39
0.37
0.35
0.34

Active Supervisor Model
C=0.9 C=0.95 λs=0.8
λs=0.8
1.00
1.00
0.91
0.91
0.82
0.84
0.75
0.77
0.68
0.70
0.62
0.64
0.56
0.59
0.52
0.54
0.47
0.50
0.43
0.46
0.39
0.42
0.36
0.39
0.33
0.36
0.30
0.33
0.28
0.30
0.26
0.28
0.24
0.26
0.22
0.24
0.20
0.22
0.18
0.20
0.17
0.18

C=0.9 λs=1
1.00
0.89
0.79
0.70
0.63
0.56
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.36
0.32
0.29
0.26
0.23
0.21
0.19
0.17
0.15
0.14
0.13
0.11

C=0.95 λs=1
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.72
0.65
0.58
0.52
0.47
0.42
0.38
0.34
0.31
0.28
0.25
0.23
0.21
0.19
0.17
0.15
0.14
0.12

As shown in Figures 38 through 43, the active supervisor model consistently shows
better system reliability when compared with the passive supervisor model. System
reliability is then compared for both supervisory models at time t=1 month. Using the
active model improves system reliability by 4.9% for c=90% and by 2.4% for c=95%
for all values of λs at time t= 1 month. When taking λs = λK = λE =1/month for
comparison purposes, the active supervisor model is still performing better than the
passive supervisor by a difference of 1.5% for c=90% and a difference of 0.8% only
for c= 95%. This is due to the fact that, as the failure rate of the supervisor increases,
both systems move to the failure state faster. Taking the coverage of 90% with
λs=0.5/month, the active model has a better reliability by a difference of 2.5%; while
for c=95%, the active model reliability is performing better by a difference of 1.4%.
With λs=0.8/month, the active model has a better reliability by a difference of 1.8%;
while for c=95% the active model reliability is better performing by a difference of
1.0%. It is noted that for the same λs, the difference in the reliability between the
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active and passive models becomes smaller as the coverage increases. This is due to
the fact that the coverage affect more transitions in the passive model than in the
active model.
Figure 38: Reliability - Active vs. Passive - C=0.9 - λs=0.5

Figure 39: Reliability - Active vs. Passive - C=0.95 - λs=0.5
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Figure 40: Reliability - Active vs. Passive - C=0.9 - λs=0.8

Figure 41: Reliability - Active vs. Passive - C=0.95 - λs=0.8
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Figure 42: Reliability - Active vs. Passive - C=0.9 - λs=1

Figure 43: Reliability - Active vs. Passive - C=0.95 - λs=1
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It is noticed that decreasing λs has a bigger impact on system reliability than the
effect of decreasing the coverage. For example, system reliability improves when
using λs = 0.5/month compared to λs = 0.8/month for c=90% by 26% for the active
and passive models. However, the reliability only improves by 6.9% for the active
model and by 9.6% for the passive model when using c=95% rather than using c=90%
for time t = 1month and any λs.
Therefore, to conclude the finding of this Markov modeling and reliability analysis
for this specific case study, the active supervisor model is more reliable than the
passive supervisor model.
The main advantage of the passive supervisor appears when observing the load on
the supervisor. For example, in the FF state KiKjEiEjS, the passive supervisor receives
240 packets per second from the door-cameras and sends zero packets per second but
when using the active mode, it receives 76490 packets per second for both control
packets and door-camera packets so it handles more load. The below table illustrates
the traffic handled by the supervisor in each state for both the passive and active
models. It can be noticed that, in the passive model, the supervisor handles less load
in most states which is expected to decrease its probability of failure. Moreover, an
additional advantage for the passive model would be when the supervisor fails before
any of the other four servers. For example, if the supervisor fails after the failure of
Ki, in the active model, this means that the control operation in Wi totally fails.
However, in the passive model, the control load of Wi will be handled by Ei and the
control functionality can still be operational but the door-cameras as well as the
supervision functionality will be lost.
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Table 8: Traffic handled by Supervior in each state

Scenarios

Passive Model Traffic
( Packets/Sec)
Received
Sent

Active Model Traffic
( Packets/Sec)
Received
Sent

KiKjEiEjS

240

0

76490

0

KiEiEjS

240

0

76490

67500

KiKjEiS

240

0

76490

0

KiEiS

76490

0

76490

67500

KiEjS

76490

0

76490

67500

KiKjS

76490

0

76490

67500

EiEjS

76490

0

76490

0

KiS

76490

67500

76490

67500

EiS_Wi / EiS

76490

67500

EiS_Wj/ EiS

76490

67500

76490

67500

S

76490

67500

76490

67500
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In the field of Networked Control Systems (NCS), Ethernet is a strongly emerging
technology. Even though Ethernet is a non-deterministic network, recent research has
shown that it could be used in the context of control networks in industrial and
automotive environments. Furthermore, Ethernet was shown to be successful in the
implementation of a Networked Control System connecting sensors, controllers and
actuators on a train wagon together with entertainment loads (wired and wireless). In
this research, two of the one-wagon train models were combined. Furthermore,
entertainment server was added in each wagon. OPNET simulations showed that
control packet end-to-end delay requirements are successfully met while zero packets
were dropped. This end-to-end delay (from sensor to actuator through the controller)
included all processing, propagation and queuing delay. One advantage of such
architecture is its fault-tolerant aspect. OPNET simulations further showed that one
controller could handle the control payload of two wagons. Consequently, the system
could tolerate the failure of up to three servers.
An analysis was then performed to compare the reliability of a one-wagon train
network with the two-wagon train model discussed in this research; it is shown that
there was a significant improvement in reliability. Reliability was expected to increase
because controller failures did not necessarily cause system failure. However, the
error detection and system reconfiguration, needed to be successful in order to
improve the reliability. The coverage parameter describes the probability of
successful error detection and reconfiguration. The effect of the coverage on the
reliability analysis was shown. Furthermore, a novel fault-tolerant reliability scheme
for the two-wagon train model was developed. This scheme aimed at increasing the
reliability of the control function in the presence of the coverage parameter. A
Markov model was then used to calculate the modified system reliability. This
reliability is then compared to the reliability previously obtained for the two-wagon
fault-tolerant scheme with coverage. It is proven that the proposed scheme had a
higher reliability. All results were compared to estimates produced by the SHARPE
software package and were found to be identical.
Further in the research, a new Hybrid model for the network while adding doorcameras to enhance passenger safety was studied. This model had a hierarchical
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architecture and included a passive supervisor. OPNET simulations proved that the
functionality of this model in the fault free condition. A fault-tolerance scheme is then
investigated to prevent system failure in case of one or more Controller/Entertainment
Server fail. A greater importance was given to the Control load over the
Entertainment load to ensure train functionality. Different scenarios have been
simulated with OPNET to mimic the different unique network states. In both the fault
free and faulty scenarios, the simulations showed that the control packet end-to-end
delay is within acceptable limits with zero control packet losses. The network will still
be functioning after the failure of both Controllers and both Entertainment Servers.
A new role was then defined for the supervisor. As soon as either Controller fails,
it acts as a backup for the failed Controller and handles its control load; therefore, it
became an active node. For safety purposes, no other node acted as backup for any
failed Entertainment Server; the entertainment was dropped when the Entertainment
server failed. All possible combinations of operational Servers/Controllers were
simulated using OPNET. It was shown that the control packet end-to end delays met
the control requirements and that no packet was dropped. The network was proven to
function properly even after the failure of all Controllers and Entertainment Servers;
the Supervisor was able to successfully carry the control load of both wagons. It was
also shown that this architecture has the advantage of keeping entertainment services
operational for a longer period when compared to other hierarchical architectures in
the literature.
Markov models were formulated for the network model with passive and active
supervisors. The system reliability was then found using SHARPE for different
recovery and reconfiguration coverage and for different failure rate of the supervisor
node. These models could be used as a design or observation tool for the system to
determine the supervisor to be used based on its failure rate to maintain a certain
system reliability. It has been found, for a specific case study, that the network
reliability is always better when using active supervisor rather than passive supervisor
even when the supervisor rate is the same as the controller and entertainment server
failure rates. The main edge for the passive model appears when noticing the load on
the Supervisor node as its is much less in the passive supervisory mode than in the
active mode.
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APPENDIX – CONFIDENCE ANALYSIS
All results subjected to a confidence analysis follow the following calculations.
Let:

X:

random variable (maximum end-to-end delay).

µ:

Average of X

σ2: Variance of X
Xi:

sample of X obtained during ith OPNET simulation (using different seed)

n:

No. of OPNET simulations

x:

Sample mean

s2 :

Sample variance

]=

B

! =

a

(1)

^ _`

`bc

1
^(Gd − ])
−1

(2)

deB

In, OPNET Network Modeler, a ‘seed’ value is required. This seed is used to
initialize different random number generator equations. These equations are used to
simulate the different behavior of non-deterministic aspects. Based on the Central
Limit Theorem (CLT), if the distribution of a random variable is unknown, the
distribution of its sample mean will approach a normal distribution, as the number of
samples increases. The sample mean also approaches the ensemble mean and the
variance of the sample mean is a scaled version of the ensemble mean (mean of x = µ
= mean of X and variance of x= σ x2 =

σ2
n

where σ2 = variance of X [32, 49].

Therefore, the confidence level is defined as the probability that x is below a
certain distance from µ:
f=

]−g
hi

(3)
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z:

is a normal random variable (mean= 0 & variance = 1).

(−fj < f < fj ) = l

(4)

|] − g|
J
< fj Q = l
hi

(5)

By using 33 simulations, n > 30 and hence the sample standard deviation s can be
used instead of σ as it is difficult to find σ x =

σ
n

. The Normal distribution will be used

and zα is calculated for a confidence level α = 95%.
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